

AFCIN-3
2 Nov 1962

ACTIONS TAKEN REGARDING THE CUBAN CRISIS

SUMMARY

1. This is a chronological presentation of AFIC actions, taken or planned, organized or offered in connection with the Cuban crisis.
2. In accordance with the guidance furnished by AFCIN-Y, the AFCIN Project Office, all such significant actions since 29 August 1962 (the date of discovery of the first SAM site in Cuba) through 3 November 1962 are presented. In a few instances actions prior to this period are also presented because they are considered to bear on the problem.
3. The types of actions undertaken generally fall into four categories:
 - a. Providing personnel to organizations external to AFIC.
 - b. Providing intelligence information and targeting support on a quick response basis to spot requests.
 - c. Maintaining liaison with organizations external to AFIC.
 - d. Performing the regular targeting and estimating functions.

One element was paramount in all of these actions -- timeliness. The requirement for speedy response on a round-the-clock basis was met primarily by putting certain analysts and photo interpreters on an on-call basis to organizations external to AFIC who required this support and by maintaining an intelligence room in an all-source area which was manned at all times and which was the AFIC duty office after normal working hours.

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[REDACTED]

4. Main problem areas stemmed from unusually stringent security procedures that went into effect upon receipt of photography confirming the existence of MRBM/IRBM sites in Cuba, from the general non-availability of photography during the crisis period, and from the lag in receipt of collateral information. The effect of these three factors was to limit severely the timely application of AFIC analytical resources to the new intelligence information being received. Although AFIC had realigned its functions and responsibilities on Cuba so as to achieve the type and emphasis of treatment normally accorded the Sino-Soviet Bloc, there was a dearth of high quality photography available to AFIC. Accordingly, targeting of MRBM/IRBM sites and nuclear weapons storage sites was not carried out as quickly or effectively as it should have been, evaluations of TAC target lists were hampered, and targeting of other less high priority facilities only now is getting under way.

5. Events to date reveal the following major requirements:

- a. An established procedure for the most rapid possible receipt in AFIC of reconnaissance photography irrespective of the collecting agency or service.
- b. An understanding that responsibility for targeting constitutes a "must know."
- c. Improvement in the amount of time necessary to handle and dispatch collateral material.
- d. Standing Operating Procedure for AFIC in emergency situations where the AJCC has not been activated, i.e., DEFCON-3 and below.

ACTION : Information Regarding the Feasibility of Moving Missiles to Cuba

ACTION OFFICER

: Mr. [REDACTED]
AFCIN-21

DATE INITIATED: 23 October 1962

FINAL FORM/DISTRIBUTION: KY telephone call to Col [REDACTED] AFCIN-28

REQUIREMENT : Information concerning the feasibility of moving missiles to Cuba by air or sea transport.

REQUESTING AUTHORITY : Colonel [REDACTED] AFCIN-28, for Major General [REDACTED], Deputy Director of Plans for Aerospace Plans.

REACTION TIME : 23 October 1962 with a follow-up at 0900 24 October 1962.

SUMMARY : Colonel [REDACTED] wished to know the feasibility of transporting missiles from the USSR to Cuba by using the TU-114/CLEAT, the IL-18/COOT, the AN-3/CAMP, and the AN-12/CUB transports, or by using the present classes of Soviet submarines. It was determined that the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles could not be broken down into small enough packages to be carried by the CLEAT or the COOT without major structural modifications. It was further determined that neither the CAMP nor the CUB has the necessary range to make the flight without touching down in, or flying over, US territory. Through information gathered from AFCIN-3F, it was determined that no Soviet submarine had the capability of transporting either the SS-4 or the SS-5 either assembled or disassembled. This information was reported to Colonel Farrier on 23 October. On the morning of the 24th, Colonel [REDACTED] wished to know if the SS-4 or the SS-5 could be transported in any manner by surface vessel without detection. It was determined that this was not feasible at the present time if the detection crews were sufficiently trained.

REMARKS : it was estimated that the structural modifications to enable the CLEAT or the COOT to make this flight would take approximately two months while the installation of a suitable deck capsule on Soviet submarines would require not less than 6 months.

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ACTION: Evaluation of CINAF/CANT OPLAN 312

ACTION OFFICER: Major [REDACTED] AF/CIN-3K3

DATE INITIATED: 22 October 1962

FINAL FORM/DISTRIBUTION: Letter with Attachments
to JCS (J-2)

REQUIREMENT: To assess the residual Cuban military capability after implementation of CINAF/CANT OPLAN 312.

REQUESTING AUTHOR: Telephone call from Colonel [REDACTED] JCS (J-2) to AF/CIN-3P; and a J-2 chaired meeting attended by DIA, ONI, ACSE-Army and AF/CIN-3.

REACTION TIME: The final terms of reference were established by 1700, 22 October 1962. The product was delivered by 1500 23 October 1962.

SUMMARY: The single deficiency in the plan was the omission of certain targets which resulted from subsequent photo reconnaissance missions. Despite these omissions continuing AFIC-TAG liaison had corrected the discrepancy. The residual Cuban military capability was assessed as ineffective.

REMARKS: No problems encountered.

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ACTION: Report of Construction Activity within Close Proximity
of Guantanamo Bay Cuba Naval Air Facility

DATE: 21 November 1962

ACTION OFFICER: Mr. [REDACTED]

FINAL FORM/DISTRIBUTION: Formal
Report hand carried to AF314-3

REFERENCE: From: AF314 with synthesized evaluation report of any type construction currently taking
place within close proximity to the Naval Base perimeter.

REACTION TIME: 5 hours

SUMMARY: As a result of searching several hundred refugee reports it was determined that large excavations
have taken place since 1961 close to the base perimeter and that apparently some construction is
presently in progress because one report, dated July 1962, states that during the past year work
has been progressing on a tunnel from the vicinity of El Cristo and in the direction of the Pass.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ACTION: AFGIN-3E2

ACTION OFFICER: Lt Colonel [REDACTED]

DATE INITIATED: 1 November 1962

FINAL FORM/DISTRIBUTION: N/A

REQUIREMENT: Installation of shelving for storage of roll film.

RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY: AFGIN-3I (Chairman, IFB).

REACTION TIME: 4 Working days.

SUBJECT: Installation completed by Arlington Hall Station Post Engineers on 5 November 1962.

REMARKS: Approximately 3500 Linear feet of temporary wooden shelving installed in Room 1601, "3" Building Arlington Hall Station (AFGIN-3E2a, Map and Chart Library) to meet anticipated input of BLUE MOON and BRASS KNOB roll film.

(PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS: Four copies desired; single space - double space between paragraphs).

30 NOV 1962

ACTION: (S) Earmarking of Cuban Defensive Missile System Signal

ACTION OFFICER: TD-C

DATE INITIATED:

FINAL FORM/DISTRIBUTION:

Teletype to SAC

REQUIREMENT: Determine if early Cuban SAM ELINT signals were of the late-model "C" band type.

REQUESTING AUTHORITY: SAC Hq ELINT Analysis Group

REACTION TIME: Teletype reply on 9 November 1962.

SUMMARY: FTD evaluation of [REDACTED] intercepts established the general late-model nature of Soviet SAM site deployment in Cuba.

REMARKS: Special, expedited treatment is being given to all requests from operational commands, particularly in relation to the Cuban situation, for FTD technical ELINT analysis.

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